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1 Introduction
Do private firms allow third-parties to access their platform or develop ex-
tensions for their product when it is socially desirable? This question has
repeatedly been a concern for anti-trust authorities. For example, in 1955
the FCC in the United States agreed with the AT&T Bell System that an
attachment to phones (the Hush-A-Phone) that helped to reduce noise could
not be marketed and sold independently since it was a ”foreign attachment”
to the AT&T network. The FCC also concluded that all telephone equip-
ment should be sold by the network operator. This decision was however
overturned on appeal by the D.C. Circuit.1 In line with this appeal, the
FCC later (in 1968) ruled that another attachment marketed by an inde-
pendent firm, the Carterfone, should be able to be used on the AT&T Bell
System network.
Another example is the anti-trust case Eastern Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc 2. Kodak had excluded third-parties from being able
to service the equipment they had sold. The Supreme Court, however, ruled
that external firms should be able to service Kodak’s equipment.
In contrast to previous literature on this question, I take a two-sided
market approach and propose two new reasons for why private incentives
may be insufficient. First, a private firm may not be able to internalize
all benefits from cross-group externalities arising when third-parties are in-
volved. Second, firms may have strategic incentives to shut out producers
of third-party extensions because closed platforms relaxe competition for
consumers.
My arguments are based on the recent literature on two-sided mar-
kets.3 In two-sided markets, platforms intermediate transactions between
two groups of agents. The groups impose externalities on each other, and
platforms should set price to each group so as to best internalize these exter-
nalities. If we assume the groups are consumers and third-party producers
of extensions to the platform, we can analyze if platforms’ incentives to deal
with both groups instead of just one are socially efficient.
1Hush-A-Phone Corp., 20 .F.C.C. 391, 420 (1955) (Decision), rev’d, 238 F2.d 266 (D.C.
Cir. 1956)
2Eastern Kodak Co. v. Image Tech Services, 125 F3d. 1995 Ninth Circuit, 1997
3Seminal papers include Rochet and Tirole (2003), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet
and Tirole (2006), Hagiu (2006) and Armstrong (2006).
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I start out in section 2 by setting up and discussing a simple monopoly
model. I show that social incentives to allow third parties access to the plat-
form are likely stronger than private incentives. I then introduce competi-
tion between platforms in section 3 to show that platforms may inefficiently
choose to commit to excluding third-parties because it relaxes competition
for consumers.
The literature on vertical relations in complementary markets is closely
related to this paper.4 The central ”Chicago School” argument — see for
example Bowman (1957) and Bork (1978) — says that private and social
incentives for vertical integration in complementary markets should coincide.
The reason is that a platform should have no incentives to vertically integrate
into the supply of a complementary good unless it is efficient, since it can
always raise the price of the platform to internalize any potential surplus
from the sale of the complementary good.
But the basic ”Chicago School” argument can break down for several
reasons. For example, as Choi and Stefanadis (2001) show, integration may
protect against entry by competitors, and as Whinston (1990) shows, that
if the if the downstream product has other uses, integration might be used
to leverage monopoly power into the other market.
Since I depart from the two-sided market literature, I use several assump-
tions commonly not used in this literature. First, I place heavy emphasis
on the existence of cross-group externalities between consumers and third-
party extension providers. All else equal, increased participation by one
group lead to more participation by the other. Second, firms in my model
set a fee that third-partiy producers must pay for the right to develop an ex-
tension. This fee can also be negative, in which case it is a subsidy intended
to encourage participation by third-parties. Third, I consider several atom-
istic third-party extension providers that do not compete with each other
and take the fee set by the firm as given. Further, the pricing decision
of third-party extension providers is completely ”blackboxed” and they are
simply assumed to profit from interacting with consumers. The drawback
4The literature is vast and includes for example analyses of tying complementary
products (E.g. Whinston (1990), Carlton and Waldman (2002), Choi and Stefanadis
(2001) and Nalebuff (2004)), innovation and integration in systems markets (e.g. Farrell
and Katz (2000)), systems versus component competition (e.g. Matutes and Regibeau
(1988), Economides (1989), Farrell et al. (1998), non-price discrimination (e.g. Econo-
mides (1998)), and intersystem competition and vertical foreclosure (e.g. Church and
Gandal (2000)).
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Figure 1: An open platform allows for third-party extensions. A closed one
does not.
of this approach is that I assume away potentially important strategic inter-
actions between the price of the main product and the price of extensions
set by third-party providers. The benefit is a new perspective emphasizing
cross-group externalities and pricing to internalize them.
2 All Benefits May not be Internalized
2.1 Setup
A monopoly firm has developed a platform of quality v > 0. The platform
can either be open or closed. An open platform grants third-party producers
access to the platform so they can develop extensions for it. A closed one
does not (figure 1 illustrates).
If open, the firm sets a fee (or subsidy) for the right to develop an
extension. This fee is set simultaneously with the price for the platform.
Consumers and extension providers then observe prices and fees, form ra-
tional expectations regarding the participation of the opposite group, and
finally simultaneously make their participation decisions. Marginal costs are
zero, but costs for providing and open platform instead of a closed are F .
Consumers are distributed uniformly over the unit interval, x ∈ [0, 1]
with the platform located at x = 0. Consumers face a transportation cost
t for each unit of distance travelled on the line. It is sufficiently large so
that at optimum some consumers always choose to stay out of the market.5.
Consumer i’s location, xi, then specify her preference for the firm’s platform
5The assumption needed when the platform is closed is t > v2 and when open is
t > (a+b)(a+b+v)4f .
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and she receives utility ui = (v− txi)+bne−p if she purchases the platform.
The price of the platform is p and ne denotes the number of third-
party extensions available for the platform. The parameter b > 0 measures
the additional value of the platform to the consumer for each third-party
extension available.
The extension providers are independent monopolists. They are treated
as atomistic and are uniformly distributed on the unit interval, y ∈ [0, 1].
They are heterogeneous in terms of coming up with a business idea, setting
up shop, and providing an extension. These costs are scaled by f . Each
extension provider is able to extract an expected profit of a > 0 from each
consumer purchasing the platform.
Extension provider j has total profits pij = anc−fyj−s. If s is positive,
it represents a fee that must be paid for the right to develop an extension.
If s is negative it is a subsidy intended to encourage the development of
extensions. Development costs are sufficiently large so in equilibrium some
developers always choose to remain inactive.6 Finally, the total number of
consumers purchasing the platform is nc.
2.2 Optimal Price and Fee/Subsidy
When the platform is closed demand for the platform and the location of
the consumer indifferent between buying the platform and not buying the
platform is nc(p) = xin = 1t (v − p). The firm sets price to maximize
piC = pnc. (1)
Optimal price is p∗C =
1
2v and profits are pi
∗
C =
1
4tv
2. Consumer surplus is
CSC =
∫ x∗in
0 (v − tx− p∗C)dx = 18tv2. The second order condition −2t < 0 is
satisfied.
When the platform is open, conditional on the number of extensions
available, demand for the platform and the location of the consumer indif-
ferent between buying the platform and not buying is ncondc (p, ne) = xin =
1
t (v + bne − p). Conditional on the number of consumers buying the plat-
form, demand for developing extensions for the platform and the location
of the extension provider indifferent between providing an extension and
not providing one is nconde (s, nc) = yin =
1
f (anc − s). We can obtain con-
6The assumption needed is f > (a+b)
2
4t−2v .
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sumer demand for the platform and demand for developing extensions for
the platform as a function of p and s by simultaneously solving the equations
nc = ncondc (p, ne) and ne = nconde (s, nc).
This gives nc = 1ft−ab(f(v− p)− bs) and ne = 1ft−ab(a(v− p)− st). The
firm sets price to consumers and the fee (subsidy) to extension providers to
maximize
piO = pnc + sne. (2)
Optimal prices are
p∗O =
v(2ft− a(a+ b))
4ft− (a+ b)2 and s
∗
O =
vf(a− b)
4ft− (a+ b)2 . (3)
The profit, consumer surplus, and total extension provider profit at these
prices are
pi∗O =
fv2
4ft− (a+ b)2 , (4)
CS∗O =
∫ x∗in
0
(v + bn∗e − tx− p∗O)dx =
2f2tv2
((a+ b)2 − 4ft)2 , (5)
and
Π =
∫ y∗in
0
(an∗c − fy − s∗O)dy =
(a+ b)2fv2
2((a+ b)2 − 4ft)2 . (6)
The second order conditions are − 2fft−ab < 0 and 1(ab−ft)2 (4ft−(a+b)2) > 0.
I assume that 4ft − (a + b)2 > 0 to ensure that these hold. This says that
the cross-group externalities are sufficiently small in relation to the trans-
portation costs and the costs for developing extensions. At optimum, the
price and the fee (subsidy) depends on the size of the cross-group external-
ities. The firm balances the price and the fee (subsidy) to best internalize
externalities. Extension providers are subsidized if b > a. Profits are increas-
ing in cross-group externalities and in the intrinsic quality of the platform.
Because it becomes harder to attract consumers and extension providers,
profits are decreasing in consumer transportation costs and in the costs for
developing extensions.
2.3 Private versus Social Incentives
We can now compare private and social incentives to allow third parties to
access the platform and develop extensions for it. A private firm will provide
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an open platform if pi∗O − pi∗C − F > 0. In comparison, the socially optimal
choice is to provide an open platform if pi∗O−pi∗C−F+(CS∗O−CS∗C+Π∗) > 0.
The difference between these two equations,
CS∗O − CS∗C +Π∗ =
(a+ b)2(12ft− (a+ b)2)v2
8t((a+ b)2 − 4ft)2 , (7)
is positive for a, b > 0 and 4ft− (a+ b)2 > 0. The reason private incentives
differ from social incentives is that some of the benefits from cross-group
externalities goes to consumers and some to extension providers.
Proposition 1. Private incentives to provide an open platform may be
weaker than social incentives because a private firm may not be able to inter-
nalize all benefits from granting third-party producers access to the platform.
Unless the platform can extract all benefits from cross-group externali-
ties, the result in proposition 1 holds. Stepping out of this stylized model,
private incentives are too weak as long as (CSO − CSC +Π) > 0.
3 No Third-parties May Relax Competition
3.1 Setup
Consider now an extension to the model above. There are two platforms
of the same intrinsic value v > 0. They can be either closed or open and
fixed development costs, cost for opening the platform, and marginal costs
are zero. Consumers buy only one platform, but third-parties may provide
an extension for any platform that is open.7
In stage 1, the firms simultaneously decide if their platform should be
open or closed. Figure 2 illustrate possible outcomes.
In stage 2, firms observe the choice the rival made. Firms then simulta-
neously set price to consumers; firms that provided open platforms also set
a fee or subsidy to third-parties for the right to access the platform. Con-
sumers and extension providers then observe prices and fees or subsidies.
They form rational expectations regarding the participation of the opposite
group. Consumers buy the platform yielding the highest utility and third-
7Consumers singlehome and third-parties multihome. See e.g. Armstrong (2006) and
Choi (2006) for similar setups.
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Figure 2: In stage 1, firms choose between providing an open or a closed
platform. These are the possible outcomes of that choice.
parties decide for each open platform separately if they should provide an
extension or not.
Consumers choose between the two platforms located at the endpoints
of the interval x ∈ [0, 1]. The intrinsic quality of the platforms, v, is large
enough so the market is completely covered.8 The platforms differ in the
eyes of consumers only in price and in the number of third-party extensions
available. A consumer denoted by i receives utility ui1 = (v−txi)+bne1−p1
if buying platform 1 and utility ui2 = (v − t(1 − xi)) + bne2 − p2 if buying
platform 2. The number of third-parties available at platform 1 and 2 are
given by ne1 and ne2. Platform prices are p1 and p2. The transportation cost
parameter, t, measures the intensity of competition between the platforms.
Extension providers may develop extensions for both platforms. If both
platforms are open, extension providers make the decision to develop for
one platform independently from the decision to develop for the other.
There is thus no direct competition for extension providers between the
8If not, the platforms are local monopolies and the results from the monopoly model
hold. The condition needed when both platforms are closed is v > 3t2 . When both firm
provide open platforms the condition is v > 6ft−a
2−3ab
4f . When one platform is closed and
the other is open the conditions are abf(9t− 4v) > a3b+ f(6ft(3t− 2v) + b2v) + a2(b2 +
f(v−3t)) and f(b2(3t−v)+6ft(2v−3t)) > a(a2b+2ab2+b3−3aft−12bft+(a+4b)fv).
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firms. Extension providers must pay the fixed development cost twice if
they wish to supply an extension for both platforms. Conditional on the
number of consumers at each platform, an extension provider j has profits
pijk = anck−fyj−sk from each platform k ∈ {1, 2}. The costs of developing
extensions are high enough to ensure that some developers always stay out
of the market.9
3.2 Stage 2: Equilibrium Prices and Fees/Subsidies
If both platforms are closed the model reduces to the standard Hotelling
model. For the consumer indifferent between purchasing the platform from
firm 1 or firm 2, v − txin − p1 = v − (1 − t)xin − p2 holds. Then demand
for firm 1’s platform is nc1 = 12 +
p2−p1
2t and demand for firm 2’s platform is
nc2 = 1−nc1. The firms simultaneously set price to consumers to maximize
pikCC = pknck. (8)
This results in equilibrium prices of p∗k = t, and profits of pi
∗
kCC =
t
2 . The
second order conditions, −1t < 0, are satisfied. Consumer surplus is CS∗CC =∫ x∗in
0 (v − tx − p∗1)dx +
∫ 1
x∗in
(v − t(1 − x) − p∗2)dx = v − 5t4 . As is standard,
prices and profits are decreasing in the intensity of competition between the
firms.
When both platforms are open the consumer indifferent between pur-
chasing platform 1 and purchasing platform 2 is located the xi that satisfies
v + bne1 − txi − p1 = v + bne2 − (1 − t)xi − p2. Demand for firm 1’s plat-
form conditional on the number of extensions at each platform is ncondc1 =
1
2 +
bne1−bne2
2t +
p2−p1
2t , and demand for firm 2’s platform is n
cond
c2 = 1−ncondc1 .
The developer indifferent between developing an extension for platform k
and not developing one is located at yk = 1f (anck − sk). Demand for de-
veloping extensions for platform k conditional on the number of consumer
purchasing each platform is then ncondek =
1
f (anck − sk). To obtain demands
as functions of prices on both sides of the market we simultaneously solve
the equations nc1 = ncondc1 , nc2 = ncondc2 , ne1 = nconde1 and ne2 = nconde2 . This
9The assumptions needed are f > a+b4 when the platforms are open and f(a
2 + 4ab+
b2 + 3(a+ b− 4f)t) < ab(a+ b)) when one platform is open and the other is closed.
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gives
nc1 =
b(s2 − a− s1) + f(p2 − p1 + t)
2(ft− ab) , (9)
nc2 =
b(s1 − a− s2) + f(p1 − p2 + t)
2(ft− ab) , (10)
ne1 =
a(b(s1 + s2) + f(p2 − p1 + t))− a2b− 2fs1t
2f(ft− ab) , and (11)
ne2 =
a(b(s1 + s2) + f(p1 − p2 + t))− a2b− 2fs2t
2f(ft− ab) . (12)
The firms simultaneously set prices, pk, to consumers and the fees(subsidies)
to extension providers, sk, to maximize
pikOO = pknck + sknek. (13)
Equilibrium prices are p∗k = t − 14f (a(a + 3b)) and s∗k = 14(a − b). Profits,
consumer surplus and total extension provider profits at these prices are
pi∗kOO =
t
2
− a
2 + 6ab+ b2
16f
(14)
CS∗OO =
∫ x∗in
0
(v + bn∗e1 − tx− p∗1)dx+∫ 1
x∗in
(v + bn∗e2 − t(1− x)− p∗2)dx
= v − 5ft− a
2 − 4ab− b2
4f
(15)
Π∗OO =
∫ y∗1
0
(an∗c1 − fx− s∗1)dx+∫ y∗2
0
(an∗c2 − fx− s∗2)dx
=
(a+ b)2
16f
(16)
The second order conditions, - fft−ab < 0, − 2ft−abf(ft−ab) < 0, and 8ft−a
2−6ab−b2
4(ab−ft)2 >
0 are satisfied for 4ft − (a + b)2 > 0. In equilibrium, firms balance price
to consumers with fees (or subsidies) to extension providers so as to best
internalize cross-group externalities. Prices and profits are lower than when
the platforms are closed because both platforms have strong incentives to cut
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price to consumers. These incentives are increasing in the size of the cross-
group externalities. A price cut when open not only attracts more consumers
but more extension providers as well. The cost of providing extensions (f)
affects the extent of this feedback effect. It is smaller the larger the costs
of developing applications. Hence, profits (and prices) are increasing in
the costs of providing extensions. Prices and profits are decreasing in the
intensity of competition for consumers (decreases in t).
Consider now the case in which one platform is open and one closed.
Assume firm 1 has the open platform and firm 2 has the closed platform.
Conditional on the number of extensions available at platform 1, the con-
sumer indifferent between the platforms is located at xin with xin satisfying
v + bne1 − txi − p1 = v − (1 − t)xi − p2. Demand for platform 1 condi-
tional on the number of extension providers that develop for platform 1 is
ncondc1 =
1
2 +
bne1
2t +
p2−p1
2t and demand for platform 2 is n
cond
c2 = 1 − ncondc1 .
The developer indifferent between developing for platform 1 and not devel-
oping is located at y1 = 1f (anc1− s1). Demand for developing extensions for
platform 1 conditional on the number of consumers purchasing platform 1
is then nconde1 =
1
f (anc1 − s1). To obtain demands as functions of prices on
both sides of the market, I simultaneously solve the equations nc1 = ncondc1 ,
nc2 = ncondc2 and ne1 = nconde1 . This gives
nc1 =
bs1 + f(p1 − p2 − t)
ab− 2ft , (17)
nc2 =
ab− bs1 − f(p1 − p2 + t)
ab− 2ft , and (18)
ne1 =
a(p1 − p2 − t) + 2s1t
ab− 2ft . (19)
Firm 1 sets price to consumers and the fee (or subsidy) to extension providers
to maximize
pi1OC = p1nc1 + s1ne1. (20)
Firm 2 simultaneously sets price to consumers to maximize
pi2OC = p2nc2. (21)
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Equilibrium prices are
p∗1 =
(4ft− a(a+ b))(3ft− ab)
f(12ft− a2 − 4ab− b2) , (22)
s∗1 =
(a− b)(3ft− ab)
12ft− a2 − 4ab− b2 , and (23)
p∗2 =
(6ft− (a+ b)2)(2ft− ab)
f(12ft− a2 − 4ab− b2) . (24)
Platform profits, consumer surplus and extension provider profits are
pi∗1OC =
(8ft− (a+ b)2)(ab− 3ft)2
f(a2 + 4ab+ b2 − 12ft)2 , (25)
pi∗2OC =
((a+ b)2 − 6ft)2(2ft− ab)
f(a2 + 4ab+ b2 − 12ft)2 , (26)
CS∗OC =
∫ x∗in
0
(v + bn∗e1OC − tx− p∗1OC)dx+∫ 1
x∗in
(v − t(1− x)− p∗2OC)dx
=
2(ab− 3ft)(((a+ b)2 − 5ft)(ab− 3ft) + f(a2 + 4ab+ b2 − 12ft)v)
f(a2 + 4ab+ b2 − 12ft)2 +
((a+ b)2 − 6ft)(((a+ b)2 − 6ft)(2ab− 5ft) + 2f(a2 + 4ab+ b2 − 12ft)v)
2f(a2 + 4ab+ b2 − 12ft)2 ,(27)
Π∗OC =
∫ y∗iOC
0
(an∗c1OC − fy − s∗1OC)dy +
∫ y∗iOC
0
(an∗c1OC − fy − s∗1OC)dy
=
(a+ b)2(ab− 3ft)2
2f(a2 + 4ab+ b2 − 12ft)2 . (28)
The second order conditions - 2f2ft−ab < 0, − 4t2ft−ab < 0 and 8ft−(a+b)
2
(ab−2ft)2 > 0
are satisfied for 4ft − (a + b)2 > 0. By reversing the identities of the
platforms, we can get profits under the outcome Closed-Open. These profits
are pi∗1CO = pi
∗
2OC and pi
∗
2CO = pi
∗
1OC . Application developers are subsidized
if b > a. The size of cross-group externalities and the costs of developing
applications can either increase or decrease profits. The reason is that while
cross-group externalities benefit the platform, they also lead to intensified
competition for consumers (more on this below).
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Figure 3: The simultaneous game played by private firms before they set
prices and fees.
3.3 Stage 1: Private versus Social Incentives
Let us now compare private and social incentives to provide an open plat-
form. Start with social incentives. Which of the four possible combinations
of open and closed platforms would maximize social welfare? Suppose we
measure social welfare as the unweighted sum of consumer surplus, firm
profits and third-party producer profits. Then, it is best for society as a
whole to have both platforms open if
CS∗OO + pi
∗
1OO + pi
∗
2OO +Π
∗
1OO > CS
∗
CC + pi
∗
1CC + pi
∗
2CC , (29)
CS∗OO + pi
∗
1OO + pi
∗
2OO +Π
∗
1OO > CS
∗
OC + pi
∗
1OC + pi
∗
2OC +Π
∗
OC , and(30)
CS∗OO + pi
∗
1OO + pi
∗
2OO +Π
∗
1OO > CS
∗
CO + pi
∗
1CO + pi
∗
2CO +Π
∗
CO. (31)
The first condition always holds since the difference between the left and
right side is 1f ((a+ b)
2) > 0. The second and third conditions are equivalent
in this model. It is possible to show that they hold for ft sufficiently large.10
Hence, for sufficiently large ft it is socially optimal to have both platforms
open.
If the firms privately choose between open and closed platforms, they
play the simultaneous move game in figure 3. Each firm will have a dominant
strategy to provide an open platform if
pi∗1OC > pi
∗
1CC , (32)
pi∗2CO > pi
∗
2CC , (33)
pi∗1OO > pi
∗
1CO, and (34)
pi∗2OO > pi
∗
2OC . (35)
10The difference between the left and right side can be simplified to 4(17a4 + 72a3b +
106a2b2 + 72ab3 + 17b4)ft < 3(a + b)2(a4 + 8a3b + 10a2b2 + 8ab3 + b4 + 72f2t2), which
holds for sufficiently large ft.
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The first two and the second two conditions are equivalent. The first two
conditions hold for 2a2b2 + (a2 − 6ab+ b2)ft > 0, which is positive for large
ft only if a2 − 6ab + b2 > 0 or equivalently if (a − b)2 − 4ab > 0. Hence,
for large ft and sufficiently small difference in cross group externalities, so
that (a − b)2 − 4ab < 0, firms will not have incentives to provide open
platforms even if it would be socially desirable. The reason is that opening
the platform makes the rival more aggressive in pricing.
Proposition 2. There exist cases in which competing platforms exclude
third-party providers in a sub-game perfect equilibrium. This exclusion is
socially inefficient both because third-party providers are excluded and be-
cause it relaxes competition for consumers.
To see that competition is intensified, consider the best response func-
tions of the firms. The best response functions for price for firm 1 when its
platform is closed are p1(p2)CC = t+p22 , and p1(p2, s2)CO =
t+p2
2 − b(a−s2)2f .
When firm 1 provides an open platform the best response functions are
p1(s1, p2)OC = t+p22 − (a+b)s12f , and p1(s1, p2, s2)OO = t+p22 − (a+b)s12f − b(a−s2)2f .
Studying these, we can see that because b(a−s2)2f > 0 in equilibrium, firm 1
has incentives to price more aggressively if firm 2 provides an open platform.
4 Conclusions
Do private firms allow third-parties to access their platform and develop
extensions for their product when it is socially desirable to do so? In this
paper I proposed two reasons for why this may not be true. First, a private
firm may not be able to internalize all benefits from cross-group externalities
arising with third-party extensions. Second, firms may have strategic incen-
tives to shut out producers of third-party extensions as a device to relax
competition for consumers.
My analysis suggests that private incentives to allow third-parties ac-
cess to platforms may be insufficient. It hence supports the argument that
policy should be directed towards supporting open platforms that allow
third-parties to access the platform and develop extensions for it.
14
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